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 I. Introduction 
 
 
 The nineteenth century was a time of astonishing change in technologies of 
transportation. When the Constitution was ratified, to travel from New Haven to Hartford 
would require an arduous and uncertain trip on a rough road that could span more than a 
day.1 At the start of the twentieth century, railroads conveyed thousands of people daily 
along that route in a few hours, and the first automobiles were motoring over roads. The 
great progress in infrastructure development radically transformed the commercial, 
physical, and cultural landscape of America. 
 This transformation required great mobilizations of capital and human labor, 
which, in turn, were dependent upon a variety of institutions: corporations, banks, courts 
to enforce contracts, regulatory bodies, and more. Behind the physical infrastructure of 
America lies a legal and institutional infrastructure which enables change even as it 
responds to it. This paper will explore the development of this more abstract 
infrastructure. Beginning in the late eighteenth century, business organizations and 
transactional structures progressed rapidly as they supported physical and economic 
development of the country. Vast mobilizations of energy and capital had to be 
coordinated; law served this function. Through a series of case-studies from New Haven 
the paper will consider the role of law in the development of the young nation. 
 To make a strong claim that law enabled or caused the developments of the 
nineteenth century would be difficult, if not impossible, to verify. Law is always 
                                                
1 George Henry Watrous, Travel and Transportation, in HISTORY OF THE CITY OF NEW 
HAVEN TO THE PRESENT TIME 351, 353 (Edward E. Atwater ed., 1887). 
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embedded in a larger set of economic and social practices. James Willard Hurst has 
written that “the main influences upon public policy came from currents of life outside of 
and environing the formal legal system. . . . The deepest roots of the law of the business 
corporation drew from the general life, and not just from the law.”2 But even Hurst 
conceded that we must “make due allowance for legal elements.”3 The law responds to 
the currents of social and economic energy around it, but it can also coordinate and 
channel these currents into productive and beneficial uses.  
 This paper will make this broad question of the relationship law to the economic 
and technological change more tractable by exploring it in the context of three specific 
cases: infrastructure improvements in the city of New Haven which range from the mid-
eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century. I will attend closely to the techniques of 
financing and the organizational structures that were employed to carry them out. The 
first case-study is the extension of the Long Wharf in New Haven harbor; the second is 
the construction of a network of turnpike roads; the final is the Farmington Canal. Over 
time innovations in law allowed for projects on a ever grander scale. Through these 
examples I hope to glimpse the concurrent development of the “abstract” and “physical” 
infrastructure of America. 
 The three infrastructure projects I have chosen were undertaken through corporate 
forms, so the early theory and practice of corporate law will be an important focus.4 In 
                                                
2 JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW 
OF THE UNITED STATES 154 (1970). 
3 Id. 
4 The literature is extensive; some of the seminal studies are: OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY 
FLUG HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE 
AMERICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS, 1774-1861; HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE 
& AMERICAN LAW (1991); HURST, supra note 2; Susan Pace Hamill, From Special 
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the early nineteenth century the corporation was in a state rapid flux. In 1780, colonial 
legislatures had granted only seven charters to business corporations. In the last ten years 
of the century, state legislatures conferred corporate charters upon 295 businesses.5 This 
huge increase in the practical use of the corporation stimulated juridical thinking, and 
there was “little relevant legal experience from which to draw.”6 America from early on 
made far more extensive use of the corporate form than England.7 American states, 
united and individually, built “a public policy toward the corporation almost wholly out 
of our own wants and concerns.”8 If constitutional law was the arena of our legal 
creativity in the eighteenth century, over the nineteenth our energies fastened increasingly 
onto corporate law. 
 The broad arc of development in thinking about the corporation is simple to 
describe. The “mercantilist” conception of the corporation was ceding to the classical, 
economic conception. The mercantilist corporation is a creature of the sovereign with a 
specific purpose. “State involvement was presumed from the very act of incorporation.”9 
The predominance of this conception in early America can be seen in the type of 
organizations that were incorporated. From 1780 to 1801, the states granted 317 
corporate charters to enterprises; of these almost two-thirds were for transportation 
                                                
Privilege to General Utility: A Continuation of Willard Hurst’s Study of Corporations, 49 
AM. U.L. REV. 81 (1999); Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of 
Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173 (1985); David Millon, Frontiers of Legal 
Thought I: Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201; Joseph H. Sommer, The 
Birth of the American Business Corporation: Of Banks, Corporate Governance, and 
Social Responsibility, 49 BUFFALO L.R. 1011 (2001); 
5 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 112 
(1977). 
6 HURST, supra note 2, at 8. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 12. 
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companies, such as turnpikes or toll bridges; twenty percent were for banks and 
insurance; ten percent to provide local public services, such as water; and less than 4% 
for general businesses.10 At its origin the corporation “was conceived as an agency of 
government, endowed with public attributes, exclusive privileges, and political power, 
and designed to serve a social function for the state.”11 
 This idea of the corporation began to erode in the nineteenth century and was 
eventually replaced by what Hovenkamp calls the classical model. Rather than a grant 
from the state with special privileges attached, “[u]nder classicism the corporation 
became nothing more than a device for assembling large amounts of capital so it could be 
controlled efficiently by a few active managers.”12 This view of the corporation is present 
in John Marshall’s decision in Dartmouth College v. Woodford,13 which held that a 
corporate charter was a “contract” within the meaning of Article I, section 10, and that 
therefore a state could not modify or revoke a corporate charter at will. The 
consummation of “classical theory” of the corporation was the general incorporation 
statute, which took hold in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Just about anyone 
could incorporate themselves into a firm and compete equally in the market for capital, 
labor, and products. 
 In the first half of the nineteenth century, then, the corporation underwent radical 
conceptual change. Through this period the corporation “occup[ied] a twilight zone in the 
eyes of the law, sometimes conceived of as a public instrumentality, at other times 
                                                
10 HURST, supra note 2, at 17. 
11 Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the American Business Corporation, 5 J. 
ECON. HIST. 1, 22 (1945). 
12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 12. 
13 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
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regarded as a private entity.”14 The corporations described in this paper, chartered to 
carry out infrastructure improvements in and around New Haven, are hybrid entities, 
straddling the public-private divide in a way that is mostly foreign to modern lawyers. I 
will indentify and characterize the salient features of these organizations in light their 
historical context. The major themes are: How did these organizations and their financing 
facilitate the massive undertaking of infrastructure improvement? What were the 
distributional consequences of choosing one form of organization, or one form of 
subsidy, over another? Who bore the burdens and enjoyed the benefits of infrastructure 
development, and how much did these groups overlap? 
 
II. “The Benefit of a Wharf” 
 New Haven’s settlers had commercial aspirations, and they chose to situate their 
settlement on a large harbor in order to become a trade hub for the coastal United States, 
and even Europe and the West Indies.15 Though the harbor was wide, and protected from 
the open Atlantic by Long Island, it was soon apparent that it had shortcomings: the 
harbor was very shallow and the long channel was difficult for ships to navigate.16 The 
inhabitants of New Haven recognized early on that some sort of wharf or channel, 
extending into the shallow harbor, would be necessary if their commercial aspirations 
would be realized. Within a few years of settlement the following petition appears in the 
town records: 
                                                
14 Horwitz, supra note 5, at 113. 




On the 5th August, 1644, Mr. Malbon, Mr. Lamberton and Mr. Evance, 
having seriously considered the great damage which this towne doth 
suffer many ways, by reason of the flatts which hinders vessels and boates 
from coming neare the towne when the tyde is anything low, did [ask the 
Court to] grant them Four days worke for every man in the towne fro 
sixteen to sixty years old towards the digging of a channell, and let them 
have the benefit of a Wharfe, and Ware house . . . .17 
 
 
The General Court accepted their request, and New Haven’s first wharf was constructed 
as a result of this conscription. Notably, the Court also established a committee that, in 
consultation with the governor, magistrates, and undertakers of the project, would “agree 
up such tearmes as may be equal and for the public good.”18 The Court provided for 
oversight of the project to ensure that the Wharf would indeed serve the public. In this 
very early construction project, we see both compelled contribution toward and public 
regulation of an infrastructure improvement. New Haven’s legal institutions were still 
infant, but the basic problems that will face the city in the provision of public goods – 
how to solicit public contribution, and how to monitor the product – are present in 
embryonic form, and the Court is certainly aware of them. The episode shows primitive 
legal institutions responding to enduring practical pressures. 
 The Long Wharf itself originated in a grant of land from the city to Jonathan 
Atwater and several partners in 1717. Not much was accomplished toward actual 
construction for twenty years, however, and in 1736 Atwater sold most of his interest to 
several other proprietors. They operated as an of unincorporated partnership, and through 
a mixture of subscriptions from the public and wharfage fees, promptly extended the 
                                                
17 Thomas R. Trowbridge, History of the Long Wharf in New Haven, in 1 PAPERS OF THE 
NEW HAVEN COLONY HISTORICAL SOCIETY 83, 85 (1865). 
18 Id. at 86. 
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wharf about 400 feet into the harbor.19 Through the 1840s and 50s all of the income from 
wharfage and leases was invested back into the wharf itself, in the form of extensions and 
physical repairs.20 The income could barely cover the cost of upkeep, no dividends were 
paid to the proprietors, and by 1758 the partnership had mostly folded. 
 In 1760 the proprietors of the wharf approached the Connecticut legislature for 
assistance, explaining that the wharf “is much gone to decay and wants repairing, and that 
the owners being numerous and living remote from one another, and some of them 
careless about said wharf or unable or incapacitated to contribute to said repairs, it is 
impracticable equitably to rectify and keep in repair said wharf under present 
circumstances.”21 In response the legislature granted a charter to the “Union Wharf 
Company in New Haven.” It proclaims the former proprietors of the Union Wharf 
“incorporated and imbodied into one intire company for the purpose of rectifying, 
repairing and managing said wharf for the future.”22 The charter does not enumerate the 
standard incidents of corporate personality; instead the sole power is granted “to meet 
and hold their meetings to consult about and transact, do and order the matters of 
repairing and managing said wharf.”23 That is the substance of the corporate grant. In 
essence, the charter seems to confer a rudimentary governance structure, and then the 
power to “transact” for the circumscribed purpose of the maintenance of the wharf. There 
is no explicit provision for limited liability, nor is there an authorization for issuing 
                                                
19 Anisha S. Dasgupta, Public Finance and the Fortunes of the Early American Lottery, 
24 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 227, 242 n.76 (2006). 
20 Trowbridge, supra note 17, at 90. 
21 9 THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 400 (Charles J. Hoadly ed. 
1880). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 401. 
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capital stock. In short, it is hard to perceive how the corporate form alone would improve 
the financial situation of wharf. It may, however, have led to more efficient management, 
since local partners to act without the consent of “remote” ones. 
 Indeed, the Union Wharf Company consistently lacked funds for maintenance and 
improvement. The one partial success was the construction, in 1770, of a pier off the 
shore, not connected to the main wharf.24 Remarkably, it was funded almost entirely by 
public subscriptions. There does not appear to be any sense that subscribers were thereby 
becoming shareholders in the company. Shortly before the Revolution money was scarce; 
the list of sixty subscribers contains people contributing salt, beef, molasses, brandy, and 
labor, anything to help the effort. As a nineteenth-century historian describes it: “It is 
probably one of the most extraordinary subscriptions on record, as a public spirited 
offering from a community interested in the welfare of a great public enterprise.”25 The 
subscriptions were motivated by “public-spiritedness”; the corporate form was not per se 
used to mobilize and aggregate the capital by its profit-making power.  
 For other improvements, when public subscriptions were insufficient, the Union 
Wharf Company used lotteries to raise capital.26 In 1772, the Company petitioned the 
state legislature for “liberty to set up a lottery” to raise funds to extend Long Wharf out to 
the pier where ships unloaded at high tide. The legislature granted permission to the 
Company for the lottery. One notable stipulation of the grant is that the fees collected on 
the part of the wharf constructed with lottery funds would go to Yale: “the wharfage of 
such part of said wharf as shall be built with said monies so to be raised . . . [would be] 
                                                
24 Dasgupta, supra note 19, at 243. 
25 Trowbridge, supra note 17, at 92. 
26 For a general account of lotteries as a technique of public finance in early America, see 
Dasgupta, supra note 19. 
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appropriated to the use of Yale College.”27 Since the state was granting a privilege in 
allowing the Company to hold a lottery, it apparently felt free to attach conditions. 
 The amount raised by the lottery is not recorded, but it apparently was 
insufficient.28 When the proprietors petitioned the legislature for permission to run 
another lottery, the explained the sum raised by the first was “small and inadequate to 
Effect [its] very beneficial purposes.”29 The legislature granted permission to raise £3000 
by lottery; the actual yield, however, was shy of £100. Both lotteries had failed of their 
purpose, and the company was in dire financial straits. Through 1799, no dividends had 
ever been paid for to the owners of the wharf. All of the income had been spent upon 
repairs.30 
 The most effective mode of raising capital for the wharf was through voluntary 
subscriptions. From 1802 to 1810 the about $16,000 was raised through subscriptions. 
Trowbridge explains that “the vast majority of these contributors generously relinquished 
all rights in the wharf which they might have acquired by donations.”31 These 
contributors, in other words, were not investing in the Company to profit directly by 
returns. Trowbridge indicates that these contributors were moved by an altruistic public 
spiritedness; one suspects that many also expected to profit indirectly from increased 
commerce on the wharf. This blend of motives for investment will recur in later 
infrastructure projects. 
                                                
27 Id. at 243. 
28 Id. at 244. 
29 Id.  
30 Trowbridge, supra note 17, at 95. 
31 Id. at 96. 
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 The proprietors of Long Wharf seemed perennially to have been unable to make 
repairs and improvements that they believe would have benefited the community. It was a 
public good that was underprovided, to use the language of economics.32 There is every 
reason to believe that if more sophisticated financial technologies were available—such 
as long-term public debt finance, or more advanced organizational forms—more cost-
justified work on the Wharf would have been done. 
 The story of Long Wharf, then, demonstrates what happens when “institutional 
infrastructure” lags behind the needs of “physical infrastructure,” and cannot provide the 
means to effectuate important public projects. There were two salient weaknesses in the 
method of financing the project. First, the lottery was ineffective as a method of public 
finance. Both of the lotteries held for Long Wharf raised completely insufficient funds. 
Moreover, the lotteries were probably inequitable. The Governor of Massachusetts wrote, 
in 1790, that lotteries “withdraw the people’s attention from industry, & . . . distract them 
with the hope of gain by chance & accident. They also . . . [laid] a very unequal tax upon 
the people at large; the indigent, & embarrassed . . . being . . . generally the greatest 
adventurers.”33 The same criticism would apply to New Haven. 
 Second, the corporate form of “Union Wharf Company” was not well utilized to 
aggregate capital. The corporate charter only granted powers very narrowly for the highly 
specific purpose of effectuating repairs. It is unclear whether under the charter (which 
would be construed narrowly by a court)34 the Union Wharf Company would have the 
                                                
32 See, e.g., JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 182-87 (3d ed., 
2010) (discussing the optimal provision of public goods). 
33 HANDLIN & HANDLIN, supra note 4, at 69. 
34 E.g., Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 421-22 (1837) (holding that 
corporate charters are to be strictly construed). 
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independent power to borrow money secured by a lien on property or the receivables of 
the wharfage. Additionally, there is no provision in the charter for limited liability for the 
owners of the Wharf, which would have been an inducement to further investment. 
Finally, the charter does not authorize the issuance of stock, and “subscribers” to the 
corporation do not seemed to have obtained any ownership interest in it at all. Thus the 
corporate form was not made the engine of fund-raising: People would invest as a “public 
spirited” gesture or because of the expectation of some indirect gain, and not because 
they expected to obtain any direct profit or dividend. 
 
III. “Vents for Industry”: New Haven’s Turnpikes 
 In 1862 Ralph Waldo Emerson enumerated some of the benefits of good roads: 
“When the Indian trail gets widened, graded, and bridged to a good road,—there is a 
benefactor, there is a missionary, a pacificator, a wealth-bringer, a maker of markets, a 
vent for industry.”35 In the early Republic there were many powerful advocates for 
improving the national transportation network, for opening up “vents for industry” and 
uniting the nation socially and economically. The broad economic benefits flowing from 
this sort of infrastructure development are well-known.36 George Washington recognized 
the need to “improve the country’s natural advantages by developments in 
                                                
35 Ralph Waldo Emerson, American Civilization, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan.-June 1862, 
at 503. 
36 Albert Fishlow, Internal Transportation in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth 
Centuries, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 543, 546 
(Stanley L. Engerman and Robert E. Gallman eds., 2000) (“An essential attribute of 
transport investment . . . is that its social returns tend to be large.”). 
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transportation.”37 Albert Gallatin, Jefferson’s Secretary of the Treasury, authored an 
influential report on roads and canals, where he opined: “Good roads and canals will 
shorten distances, facilitate personal and commercial intercourse, and unite, by a still 
more intimate community of interests, the remote corners of the United States.”38 
 The first substantial internal improvement projects in the United States were the 
construction of better facilities for overland transport.39 Starting in the late eighteenth 
century there was a flurry of turnpike construction throughout the country. By 1810, 
Connecticut alone had constructed 1148 miles of turnpikes, at a cost of about a thousand 
dollars a mile, more than any other state in the Union.40 Connecticut was “a real leader in 
the turnpike movement.”41 These turnpikes were almost exclusively the result of private 
enterprise rather than public investment. Throughout the Northeast, turnpike companies 
were the “leading type of business organization” in the first thirty years of the nineteenth 
century.42 In that period, one-third of all incorporations in Connecticut were for 
turnpikes.43 As such the turnpike companies are fundamental to any analysis of the nature 
of the corporation in early American law. 
 The turnpike charters that populate Connecticut’s statute books follow the same 
basic form, and indeed tend to repeat significant portions of language. The charter for the 
Hartford and New Haven Turnpike can serve as a paradigm. This turnpike company was 
                                                
37 CARTER GOODRICH, GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF AMERICAN CANALS AND 
RAILROADS, 1800-1809, at 3 (1960). 
38 Id. at 28-29. 
39 Fishlow, supra note 36, at 548. 
40 Fishlow, supra note 36, at 549 tbl. 13.1.  
41 4 JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
CORPORATIONS 221 (1917). 
42 Daniel B. Klein & John Majewski, Economy, Community, and Law: The Turnpike 
Movement in New York, 1797-1845, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 469, 470 (1992). 
43 Id. tbl. 1. 
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not the first time the state had granted a monopolistic franchise on that route: In 1717 
John Munson was granted an exclusive privilege to operate a common carrier between 
New Haven and Hartford for seven years.44 In exchange for this monopolistic grant he 
was required to depart New Haven on the first Monday of every month and return within 
a week, the coldest winter months excepted. Providing transportation through regulated 
private enterprise thus had a pre-history. 
 The corporate charter for the Hartford and New Haven Turnpike exhibits several 
notable advances on the Union Wharf Company’s charter. First, the company was 
granted the power of eminent domain, and required to post a bond of $50,000 dollars in 
the State Treasure in order to secure damage payments. Investing a corporation with the 
state’s power of eminent domain was common in that era: “In the first half of the 19th 
century, states freely lent this power [eminent domain] to private businesses that served 
‘public’ purposes—canal or turnpike companies, very notably.”45 If damage payments 
were below market value (and the records are to scant to make a judgment), this would 
have involved involuntary private subsidies for the particular public good. All in all, 
clothing turnpike companies with eminent domain power is in keeping with the dynamic, 
rather than static and agrarian, conception of property in land that took root in the early 
nineteenth century.46 
                                                
44 FREDERIC J. WOOD, THE TURNPIKES OF NEW ENGLAND 349 (1919). 
45 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 182 (2d ed. 1985). 
46 See HORWITZ, supra note 5, at 30 (“As the spirit of economic development began to 
take hold of American society in the early years of the nineteenth century, however, the 
idea of property underwent a fundamental transformation—from a static agrarian 
conception entitling an owner to undisturbed enjoyment, to a dynamic, instrumental, and 
more abstract view of property that emphasized the newly paramount virtues of 
productive use and development.”); see also JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE 
CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES 9-10 (1956). 
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 The charter specifies that “there shall be eight hundred shares” of stock in the 
corporation,47 and that the shares are “transferable.”48 It further authorizes dividends to 
the shareholders, when the income from the tolls exceeds the costs of maintenance and 
repair. When, however, the turnpike company has returned to its investors an interest of 
twelve percent per annum, “the said road and bridges shall be, and remain discharged 
from said toll.”49 That is, once a certain level of profit is reached, the turnpike reverts to 
public ownership. 
 The Company, according to the charter, would be very closely regulated. The 
charter creates a committee of two to oversee the Company’s operations. The charter 
does not explicitly require that the committee be disinterested; it is clear, however, that 
they are meant to represent the public interest, and all vacancies would be filled by 
appointments from the General Assembly. The committee is empowered, at the 
Company’s expense, to inspect the roadway and bridges of the turnpike, and make a 
report to the General Assembly; to “determine how much money is necessary and proper 
to be laid out from time to time, in repairs and betterments, on said road and bridges”; 
and to fix the place of the toll gates.50 The charter also sets out in great detail the fares 
that can be charged at the toll.51 These vary based on the size of the vehicle and the 
purpose of the trip. There are also a number of exemptions from the toll: people passing 
                                                
47 Resolve Incorporating the Hartford and New Haven Turnpike Company, 1837 Conn. 
Spec. Acts 1298. 
48 Id. at 1300. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 1299. 
51 Id. at 1298-99. 
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through to a place of worship, men engaged in military service; people “going to and 
from gristmills,” and people “attend[ing] to their ordinary farming business.”52 
 The charter grants the company more extensive powers that had been granted to 
the Union Wharf Company, and it is given far more latitude to devise its own internal 
procedures of governance in by-laws. The Company is granted authority  
to sue and be sued in all courts of record, to appoint such officers, to 
ordain and establish such by-laws, ordinances and regulations, as may be 
necessary for the government of said company, and the raising such sum 
or sums of money as shall be necessary for the discharging said damages, 
making said road, building the necessary bridges, and keeping both in 
good repair, subject however to be repealed . . . .53 
 
While the charter does not confer an official title on James Hillhouse, he is the only 
future officer mentioned by name, and is clearly at least primus inter pares. The charter 
sets a date for the first meeting at the corporation, for the purpose of choosing officers 
and adopting any necessary bylaws. Significantly, “the members of said company shall 
have as many votes in such meetings as they hold shares in said company.”54 This 
provision for shareholder control was lacking from the Union Wharf Charter. The power 
of the shareholders is, of course, attenuated by the broad powers granted to the committee 
of the General Assembly. However, the shareholder vote provision indicates, at least, that 
owners of the company’s capital were entitled to some voice in its management. 
Theoretically, the corporation was meant to serve the interests of shareholders as well as 
the public. This would be an inducement to invest. 
                                                
52 Id. at 1299. 
53 Id. at 1298. 
54 Id.  
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 The first meeting of the Hartford and New Haven Turnpike Company was held in 
November 1798. By December, it was announced that all shares in the company had 
already been purchased, and there was a waiting list of more persons eager to buy.55 
Apparently “as much joy and excitement attended the opening of the turnpike in 1799 as 
greeted the railroad thirty-eight years later.”56 Despite this enthusiasm, the company’s 
early financial performance was abysmal. Albert Gallatin, in the Report of 1808 cited 
above, gives some of the numbers. The construction of the road cost $79,261, which 
amounts to $2280 per mile for the 34.75 mile length of the road. About $18,000 of the 
capital was spent to purchase the land through which the road passes. According to 
Gallatin, the net income of the turnpike from the tolls (presumably at the time of the 
report), deducting for annual repairs and expenses, was less than $3000 dollars.57 That is 
a return of less than four pennies on the dollar to investors. 
 Over the next several years the General Assembly began to generalize the 
regulation of the proliferating turnpike companies. Indeed, one historian has written that 
“modern public-service commissions were anticipated by Connecticut as early as 
1803.”58 The Act of 1803 provided for two commissioners to be appointed annually to 
inspect turnpike roads and require repairs and improvements. The commissioners were 
empowered to order that the turnpike gates be open until the repairs were completed.59 
The Act also provides that turnpike companies and their employees “may, and they are 
hereby empowered to make such drains, and clear such water-courses, and places where 
                                                
55 Wood, supra note 44, at 349-50. 
56 Id. at 350. 
57 This section of Gallatin’s report is reproduced in Wood, surpra note 44, at 14. 
58 Id. at 34. 
59 An Act Relating to Turnpike Roads § 2, THE PUBLIC STATUTE LAWS OF THE STATE OF 
CONNECTICUT 641 (1839). 
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water may drain off from such turnpike road, into or through any person’s land, or 
possessions, so far as may be necessary, sufficiently to drain the water off, from such 
turnpike road.” This is another instance of the abrogation of the common law of property 
in the interest of economic development. 
 By some measures, the turnpike movement was an astonishing success. In the 
aggregate the turnpike companies mobilized over a million dollars to construct more than 
one thousand miles of roads in Connecticut. In the northern states as a whole, over 11,000 
miles of turnpikes were constructed from the commercial boom of the 1790s to 1830. 
Most of that was completed by 1820, and in New England even earlier.60 This represents 
an impressive mobilization of capital and resources. 
 Why did the turnpike boom happen when it did? Unlike railroads and steamboats, 
the turnpike boom was not precipitated by technological discovery. The Revolution and 
the birth of a nation at the verge of vast, unexploited continent perhaps contributed to the 
energy and timing of the project. More importantly, Connecticut had enhanced legal and 
institutional forms since the Long Wharf charter to channel the energy for public 
improvements. If “politics in the grand sense” and the deepest “organization of power” 
were the preoccupations of the eighteenth century, at the nineteenth century “was 
prepared to look at the law more casually, as an instrument to be used.”61 The turnpikes 
are an early instance of this kind of American pragmatism. 
 The central feature of the charters is the exclusive franchise and the power to 
collect tolls. This is the engine of the whole enterprise. This was enforced by laws against 
                                                
60 Fishlow, supra note 36, at 548-49. 
61 HURST, supra note 46, at 10. 
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“shunpiking,” and the penalty of double damages for toll evaders.62 The tolls functioned 
as a kind of targeted taxation. One person scribbled in a common-place book in 1795: “no 
tax can operate so fair and so easy, as that of paying turnpike toll, as each person is taxed 
in proportion to the benefit he derives from a good road, and all strangers and travelers 
are made equally tributary to its support—what can be more just?”63  
 Additionally, the corporate form and permission to issue stock allowed capital to 
flow in from beyond the confines of a single municipality. The Union Wharf Company 
had been unable to raise enough money through subscriptions to pay its expenses; it 
therefore had to resort to lotteries as device of public finance, which were unsuccessful. 
The turnpike companies, by contrast, were able to muster sufficient capital, at least for 
initial construction. Whatever the motives of the individual shareholders, the turnpike 
companies were far more successful in raising money than the Wharf. This may be due, 
in part, to organizational advances in the corporation. The charters authorized turnpike 
companies to issue shares that would pay dividends from profits. The shares were liquid, 
and, indeed were bought and sold with some frequency.64 
 Hurst explains the need the delegate certain public functions to corporations by 
reference to the political and economic realities of the time: “We felt the need to promote 
a volunteer muster of capital for sizable ventures at a time when fluid capital was scarce 
and there were severe practical limits on the government’s ability to tax in order to 
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support direct intervention in the economy.”65 The record of turnpike companies in 
Connecticut substantiates Hurst’s suggestion. But there is still a fundamental puzzle in 
this story of the turnpikes’ partial success: they were almost all unprofitable as private 
ventures. The Hartford and New Haven Turnpike was not an outlier. In New England as a 
whole, only five or six turnpikes out of 230 were demonstrably profitable ventures.66 
There are several plausible explanations for this pervasive unprofitability. Shunpiking 
was widespread and prohibitions perhaps under-enforced.67 The marginal advantage over 
common roads was slim, and perhaps not enough to justify paying the toll.68 The state 
government’s energetic regulation of the turnpike companies may also have contributed 
to financial problems – there were stringent peremptory upkeep laws, rates were fixed 
and inflexible, and the exemptions from toll paying were broad. Another possible 
explanation for unprofitability is that, given the quasi-public nature of these corporations, 
the corporations and their directors may have viewed their own purpose as greater then 
just paying high dividends to investors. The directors may have viewed their involvement 
in the turnpike as philanthropic, or as a method to enhance their social status and prestige. 
Most likely all of these factors contributed to the companies’ unprofitability. 
 Another seeming oddity is that people persistently bought stock in these 
corporations that were almost uniformly unprofitable. In New Haven, all six of the 
chartered turnpike companies quickly sold out of stock.69 It seems unlikely that people, 
seized by some speculative fever, were investing solely for direct personal profit, when 
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there was such widespread financial difficulty. Many, however, would have profited 
indirectly from the construction of the turnpikes. The turnpikes would have facilitated 
commerce and reduced shipping costs. Moreover, property values adjacent to the 
turnpikes may have increased in value as a result of construction. Indeed, many of the 
subscribers to the Company’s stock lived on or near the path of the turnpikes.70 People 
may also have been induced to invest by a lingering sense of civic duty; if the Union 
Wharf had been able to raise a substantial sum just through voluntary subscription, the 
turnpikes surely could have raised some capital with a remote prospect of gain. 
Additionally (though this is necessarily speculative) there may have been significant 
social pressure to invest; one suspects that people of means who failed to contribute 
anything, and tried to free-ride on the efforts of others, might have found their social 
standing significantly diminished. 
 
IV. “A Work Which Is Itself Magnificent”: The Farmington Canal 
 The Farmington Canal ran from the New Haven harbor about 80 miles north to 
Northampton, Massachusetts. The immediate inspiration for the Farmington Canal was 
the dazzling success of the Erie Canal in New York.71 The Erie was a financial and 
physical marvel. It extended 364 miles, from New York City to the Lake Erie, and was 
built between 1817 and 1825. It was also highly profitable. “Few public investments were 
so well rewarded or so immediate in their impact.”72 Before construction was even 
complete the canal had collected over one million dollars in revenue. In its first decade of 
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operation, the annual net gain was 8% of the total cost of the canal.73 The Erie Canal 
slashed transportation costs dramatically, as agricultural products floated east and 
manufactured products and immigrants floated west.74 It confirmed New York as the 
great commercial entrepôt of the nation.75 Finally, it was a source of national pride, an 
emblem of American ingenuity, energy, and potential. 
 New Haven was eager to emulate this success. James Hillhouse was a particularly 
emphatic advocate of a canal to open access the Farmington Valley and establish New 
Haven as a commercial center. The legislature incorporated “The President, Directors, 
and Company of the Farmington Canal” in May of 1822. As with the turnpike companies, 
the charter created a hybrid entity, with elements of a for-profit firm and a public 
instrumentality. The charter grants the normal catalogue of corporate powers – to sue and 
be sued, to establish by laws and other modes of governance, to hold land, to appoint 
officers, to employ laborers.76 It also grants all incidental powers related to the purpose of 
incorporation. The company is authorized to issue as may shares of stock “as shall be 
necessary to carry into complete effect, the entire object of said corporation.” The shares 
are fully transferable.77 Finally, the act explicitly furnishes the company with the power 
“to enter upon, and take possession of, and use . . . any lands, waters and streams 
necessary for the prosecution of the improvements intended by this act,” thus once again 
lodging the power of eminent domain in a corporation. 
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 One significant change in organizational structure from the turnpike companies is 
the creation of an explicitly disinterested commission with broad but carefully delineated 
responsibilities in the charter itself. The six-person “Board of Commissioners” is first 
directed to survey and lay out the course of the canal. The fact that the Act lodges this 
determination in the Board, who were prohibited from having any financial interest in the 
corporation, suggests that the legislature did not want to desire for profit to warp the 
course of the canal.78 The Board is also empowered to hear all claims for damages by 
those whose land was taken; the act provides that the Board “shall make a just and 
equitable estimate and appraisal of the loss or damage, if any, over and above the benefits 
and advantages to the respective owners or proprietors.”79 The subtraction of any benefit 
from the damage award reveals an affirmative policy in favor of development, consistent 
with the “dynamic” conception of land identified by Horwitz.80 Landowners are forced 
not only to surrender part of their plot, but to accept a benefit as well. The company and 
its workmen are also permitted to enter any lands with equipment to repair the canal.81  
 The commissioners are also required annually to inspect the canal, bridges, and 
other appurtenances, and if they find the condition unsatisfactory, to suspend the 
collection of tolls until the defects are repaired. The act also give to the Board of 
Commissioners the power to “open subscriptions for the stock of said corporation, on 
such terms and conditions, and to such an amount, as they shall judge necessary.”82 In the 
modern corporation, the decision to issue stock to raise capital paradigmatically belongs 
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to the directors.83 Here, the power sharing arrangement between the disinterested 
commissioners and the elected officers of the corporation indicates the mixed public-
private nature of the corporation, and an ambiguity about whose interest it is in fact 
intended to serve. Finally, the board is charged with setting toll rates, provided that 
annual dividends to the company never exceed twelve percent. Simeon Baldwin was the 
first Chairman of the commission. 
 Primarily through the tenacious efforts of Simeon Baldwin, Judge Benjamin 
Wright, who had been chief engineer of the Erie Canal, was recruited to lay out the 
Farmington Canal. He estimated the costs at about $421,000. After Massachusetts 
granted to charter for the portion of the canal that would run through its state, stock 
subscriptions for the Farmington Canal were offered to the public in July of 1823. 
Although a substantial sum was raised, it was not sufficient to begin construction. The 
total amount contributed by individual stockholders over the whole life of the Farmington 
Canal Company was $237,195 – well below what was required to undertake a project of 
this scale. 
 As a result – and this is a second significant difference from the financing of 
turnpike companies – the state and city subsidized the canal company. The State of 
Connecticut did not make any direct contributions from its treasury to the enterprise. The 
city made two rather small ones: it promised to loan $100,000 in installments, secured by 
a mortgage on the canal, but then repudiated its loan after the first $20,000. When it 
reneged it also relinquished its mortgage, in effect converting the $20,000 into a gift.84 
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Additionally, the city contracted to pay the company $3000 per year to use water from 
the canal.85 This was a small portion of the 1.5 million dollars eventually sunk into the 
enterprise.86 Indeed, the government subsidies to the canal were indirect. Section 22 of 
the original charter provided that all stock in the company shall not “be subject to any 
taxation whatever.”87 A subsequent act of 1824 exempted all corporate profits from 
taxation as well. The preamble explained that the canal “if completed, would be of great 
public utility” and that the act was passed “for the purpose of inducing persons to 
subscribe to the Stock.”88 The company was exempt from taxation unless its net annual 
income exceeded 6% of its capital stock, in which case it was required to pay one-sixth of 
the excess income.89 
 The State employed a second major tactic of indirect finance. It granted a charter 
to the Mechanics Bank in 1824 with the stipulation that it would contribute $200,000 to 
the Canal Company’s stock. In return, the capital stock of the bank was forever exempt 
from all taxation.90 Similarly, in 1831 the State chartered another bank with a similar 
stipulation to buy $100,000 of company stock, in return for tax exemptions. New Haven 
itself (thought not the State) invested in $100,000 of stock at a moment of particular 
financial peril. 
 With respect to “institutional and legal infrastructure,” there are a few advances 
on turnpike companies that are notable because they presage major changes in the future, 
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even if they were not immediately effective here. First, the Canal Company was able to 
attract capital from a wider geographical area. Turnpike finance was almost completely 
local, with the lead investors often situated right on the path of the proposed road. 
Though more New Haveners invested in the canal than any other place, there was 
significant investment from New York, which, if anything, would have been hurt by a 
successful canal operating to the North. This indicates greater liquidity in capital 
markets.91 
 The change in commercial attitude, from local subscription to foreign speculation, 
is captured well in a letter from James Hillhouse to Simeon Baldwin from March 1823: 
In conversation last evening, the subject of the projected canal thro’ 
Connecticut was mentioned, and some surprise was expressed that its 
friends did not avail themselves of the present disposition in this city to 
speculate in almost every thing. Persons better able to judge than myself 
were of opinion, that, if the books were opened here under the care of 
some respectable person well known in the commercial community, the 
stock, connected as it is understood to be with a bank, would be taken of 
immediately.92 
 
In the end, there were 924 shares of Farmington Canal stock purchased in New York 
City, out of a total of 5414. Individual citizens of New Haven, by contrast, bought 1229. 
Whereas the Union Wharf had been unable to get permission to sell lottery tickets in New 
York, and turnpike investment had been local, the Farmington Canal was able to tap into 
a larger well of capital. This was probably facilitated by the explosion of banks that 
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occurred at the beginning of the nineteenth century: the number of state banks doubled – 
from 117 to 232 – in five years between 1811 and 1816.93 As Hillhouse’s letter indicates, 
these banks could help market securities out of state. 
 Another intriguing development is the possibility of foreign investment in the 
canal. In the file of the New Haven Historical Society is an instrument or bond between 
the Farmington Canal Company and a Dutch financier named Wilhelm Willink. Willink 
was a wealthy Amsterdam merchant who had been a member of the Holland Land 
Company (which had held title to some 5 millions acres of land in western New York and 
Pennsylvania) and an investor in the Louisiana Purchase.94 The bond is duly signed by 
Hillhouse as President, and bears the Company seal. The transaction involved a loan of 
$500,000 to be paid back in installments, at an interest of 5% per annum. The Company 
secured the loan by granting all its title in the canal and receivables to the Willink: “more 
effectually to secure the payment of said bond, [the Company] doth give, grant, bargain, 
sell, set over, assign, and confirm, unto [Willink], and to his heirs, and assigns forever, all 
the Right, Title, Interest, and Estate, which [it] hath in and to the Farmington Canal, so 
called . . . with full power to collect, & receive all tolls, and other emoluments arising 
from said canal . . . .” There is no mention of this bond in the few published histories of 
the canal, and there is no sign of the transaction on the accounting records of the 
company, so apparently the bond was never executed. Nevertheless, the bond is hint of 
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the wave of foreign capital that was about to reach the United States, and  would help to 
fund the railroad boom. 
 A final hint of things to come was the possibility of Federal involvement in the 
project. Hillhouse had been a United States Senator from 1796-1810, and lobbied the 
federal government aggressively for assistance with the project.95 In 1830 Samuel 
Butman, a Representative from Maine, reported a bill from the Committee on Internal 
Improvements to the House to purchase, for the United States, 250 shares of stock in the 
Farmington Canal Company. The bill never passed, but it anticipates the modern era, 
where the federal government is intimately involved local infrastructure development. All 
in all these three precocious innovations, though they did not benefit the Farmington 
Canal much, suggest a hunger for legal devices to mobilize ever more capital and to 
release commercial energies. 
 As it was, the Company labored constantly in a state of “financial 
embarrassment” almost from the start.96 Construction began in 1825 and already by 1827 
the company had depleted all the funds from the stock subscription, and was in a state of 
“financial paralysis.”97 This was only partially relieved by a subscription of stock from 
the City. Throughout the construction phase money was scarce; there were long delays 
when the company was unable to pay creditors. The company limped along, weighed 
down by debt, the income from tolls never covering the constant damage from freshets 
and vandals. 
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 A major effort to revive the company was made in 1836. The formally separate 
entities managing the two branches of the canal – one covering Connecticut, one 
Massachessets – were merged into a single company called the “New Haven and 
Northampton Canal Company.” The merger resembled a Chapter 11 restructuring. The 
two companies were dissolved and the stock relinquished. The total loss of the two 
companies was $1,039,041.62.98 Creditors of the old companies could transfer their 
claims to the new entity, some at a discount. Some creditors would be paid with stock in 
the new entity. However, even this new capital structure was not enough to rescue the 
company. To use a distinction from bankruptcy law, the firm’s distress was economic 
rather than financial.99 Meanwhile, the rapid advances in railroad technology made the 
canal increasingly obsolete. In 1846 a railroad was chartered to run alongside the canal. 
The canal closed for good in 1847. 
 The Farmington Canal Company, then, like the turnpike companies, was in 
isolation a financial disaster. It was never profitable. There is an old story, perhaps 
apocryphal, that only one shareholder ever received a dividend. He was a farmer who 
complained to the officers that no returns ever came in, and he was recommended, in 
response, to mow the grass along the tow-path. “This he did yearly to his great 
satisfaction and emolument.”100 Nonetheless, the canal was built, and was in operation 
for nearly two decades. The legal devices employed by the state were instrumental. The 
corporation was able to pool together enough capital from different jurisdictions and two 
banks to excavate thousands of tons of dirt and open a channel of trade with the interior: 
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“a work which [was] itself magnificent,” as Governor Wolcott said at the groundbreaking 
ceremony.101 However, to defend the Farmington Canal merely because it in fact was 
built or because of its “positive externalities” rings hollow when the Erie Canal to the 
south was so fabulously profitable, on its own terms. 
 Comparing the Erie Canal to the Farmington Canal is difficult. It may be that 
underlying, fundamental economic factors created the success of the former and failure of 
the latter; perhaps there was just not enough demand along the route of the Farmington 
Canal to make the construction of the canal cost-justified. On the other hand, it is 
possible that, despite the financial failure of the Company, the Canal generated enough 
positive externalities that its construction was, on balance, justified. One broadside 
published in New Haven in 1839 as part of an effort to induce investment argued:  
The Canal is of vital importance to the City of New Haven, by furnishing 
new opportunities and facilities for business; by bringing into the center of 
the city an inexhaustible supply of water for public use in case of fire; by 
cleansing low grounds which had long been a nuisance; by improving the 
harbor; by furnishing valuable water privileges, which are improved for 
highly useful manufacturing establishments; and, in general, by conferring 
great advantages on every portion of the community.102 
 
 
If this is case, then the Company could have been profitable if it had only properly 
internalized the benefits that it created. A different organizational structure may have 
rescued it. 
 Unlike the Farmington Canal, the Erie Canal was financed and built by the State. 
New York had an early experience funding water transportation projects through private 
franchise. In 1792 it had charter the Western Inland Lock Navigation Company to 
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connect the Hudson River to Lake Ontario.103 The Company ran out of funds, and never 
reached either of its designed end points. This episode may have cautioned New Yorkers 
against reliance on private corporation for large-scale infrastructure improvements.104 
 Canal plans lay dormant until the Gallatin Report renewed national interest in 
internal improvements, and New York State appointed a commission to examine the 
possible revitalization and westward expansion of the Western Company. The eventual 
commissioners “were emphatic on public financing, ownership and control of the Canal 
by New York State.”105 In a report issued to the legislature they explained: “Such large 
expenditures can be made more economically under public authority than by the care and 
vigilance of any company.”106 And so, largely due to the energetic politicking by the 
mayor of New York City, DeWitt Clinton, the legislature agreed to finance and built the 
project itself.107 It authorized in 1812 borrowing $5 million for the project, financed by 
bonds secured by the State’s credit.108 The State’s guarantee made these bonds relatively 
low-risk securities, and the issue was an enormous success.109 What DeWitt Clinton 
called “a powerful engine of commerce” had been set in motion.110 Canal paper became 
“the hot new issue of the day.”111 Wealthy New Yorkers were making large investments, 
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John Jacob Astor alone invested some $213,000,112 and soon out-of-state investors began 
to participate. As a result, New York was able to borrow more each year. The first 
interest in canal paper from British investors came in 1822, and soon there were not 
enough bond issues to satisfy the voracious foreign appetite. British investors were 
buying positions in old issues at a premium. Foreigners would ultimately own more than 
half of the $8 million canal debt.113 Income from the Canal was enough that, even at the 
height of its indebtedness, New York’s canal fund was operating at a surplus.114 
 The remarkable success of the Erie Canal invites a critical comparison with the 
Farmington Canal. Why was the project not, like Erie, financed through bonds? Why was 
it financed through equity, and not public debt? One explanation is political. A powerful 
faction in Connecticut favored improving navigation on the Connecticut River and 
building a Canal around Enfield Falls.115 This would have improved Hartford’s 
commercial standing. The Farmington Canal, by contrast, would boost New Haven at the 
expense of Hartford in competition for business in the Connecticut Valley. The so-called 
“Riverites” opposed the interests on the canal.116 It may simply have been impossible to 
secure public financing for the canal with such a powerful set of opponents in Hartford. 
Additionally, in the absence of some targeted tax, the people of Hartford could not have 
been enthusiastic about guaranteeing with their tax dollars the debt of a canal company 
that would only hurt them economically. 
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 New Haven itself could not issue municipal bonds without the authorization of the 
state. State governments were fully sovereign and so could borrow money; cities needed 
an express grant from the state legislature to do the same. In 1732 the Connecticut 
legislature dissolved the town government of New London for borrowing “without the 
Authority of this Government.”117 Though now long-term debt has justly been called “the 
foundation of modern urban life,”118 it was not until after the Civil War that Connecticut 
even granted municipalities the power to issue bonds when they wished.119 
 Many public goods that municipalities can provide have a substantial life. The 
economic benefits from a canal or road, for example, are spread out across time. The 
advantage of debt financing of a public good of this sort is that it spreads the financial 
burdens across time correspondingly. The first generation of users, if forced to bear the 
whole cost, will be induced to undersupply the public good. Debt finance, by contrast, 
“provides the relevant mechanism for spreading the costs of public projects over time.”120 
The municipality can then pay back the debt either through taxes, assessments, or tolls. 
 The usefulness of debt financing for a canal is evident. A canal requires a large 
up-front investment and has a long useful life, and then the income from tolls can focus 
the burden on a specific group of users. The success of the Erie Canal vindicates this 
model. On the other hand, if a corporation is profitable, it could conceivably distribute 
the burden just as effectively, and enrich risk-taking investors through dividends. The 
corporate form imposes the risk of the enterprise on a group of investors, sometimes but 
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not necessarily beneficiaries of the public good; debt finance diffuses the risk through a 
jurisdiction who presumably will be the beneficiaries of the public good. In this way, debt 
finance can internalize the benefits created by a public goods, by imposing most risk on 
the likely beneficiaries. 
 It is difficult to undertake a critical analysis of the financial and legal mechanisms 
employed on the Farmington Canal, since there are so many moving variables. As a 
starting point, it is worth noting that the canal was built (by no means a certainty), and 
that the community realized some commercial benefit as a result. The canal would 
probably not have been built without some legal ingenuity, and advances on the 
institutional forms that generated the turnpikes. The indirect forms of public finance, 
through the compelled subscriptions of newly chartered banks and tax breaks, were 
lifelines at vital moments. 
 But one ultimately is left with the impression that a more public approach, like 
that taken on the Erie Canal, may have been the better choice. Debt financing with the 
guarantee of a State makes the investment more attractive to less daring investors. More 
capital could have been raised up front. There is some suggestion that the commissioners 
of the canal chose the cheapest methods of construction available out of shortage of 
funds, even when not in the long term interest of the company.121 For example, the locks 
were built from wood apparently because it was the cheapest option; over the years, the 
wood rotted and had to be replaced, and great expense to the company.122 A better initial 
job at construction may have made the canal more reliable, which would have 
encouraged more traffic, and generated more revenue, which then could have been re-
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invested, in a virtuous cycle. As it was, the initial shortage of capital created a vicious 
cycle of shut-downs, loss of revenue, and inadequacy of funds. All in all, the Farmington 
Canal is a story of mixed success; an important public good was provided, due in large 
part innovative financial maneuvers. However, the city was not able to avail itself of a 




 “Internal improvements” of the sort discussed in this paper—wharves, roads, 
canals—are classic public goods.123 Private providers of pure public goods cannot reap 
the benefits they produce. Basic economic theory holds that, as a result, “the private 
sector in fact underprovides public goods because of the free-rider problem.”124 One does 
not have to contribute to public goods in order to enjoy them, so provision for them will 
be less than socially optimal. Did New Haven underprovide public goods by delegating 
provision to private corporations? Calculating the “socially optimal” amount of wharves, 
turnpikes or canals would be complex; suffice it to say, however, that New Haven was 
not paralyzed by the free rider problem in providing them. A tremendous amount of labor 
and capital was directed toward significant infrastructure development: a wharf and a 
pier, hundreds of miles of roads, and an eighty-mile canal. These are not mean 
achievements.  
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 A combination of factors allowed for New Haven to provide these adequately, if 
not optimally. First, the projects were not truly left to the “private sector.” To say that 
roads or canals in New Haven were “privatized” would be to mask a much more complex 
reality. There was significant public oversight, and many of the powers that would be 
vested in the directors of a modern corporation were given to appointees of the state; 
conversely, certain powers of the state were vested in the corporation. Second, tolls made 
the good in question at least partially excludable, and so helped the corporation 
internalize the benefits they have produced. Finally, New Haveners seemed authentically 
motivated by a kind of civic pride and altruism. The fact that stock sold so readily even 
when it was of dubious value suggest that people were merely pursuing their own private 
gain. The tireless efforts of New Haven’s leading citizens toward the projects also 
suggest that social capital was abundant. Moreover, desire for prestige and status is a 
powerful motivator, and these corporations were an arena for citizens to distinguish 
themselves and gain social standing. 
 Another issue in the provision of public goods is how most effectively to 
distribute the burden of creating them. In the case of the projects studied here, this was 
partially solved by the mechanism of tolls, which function as a special assessment on 
users. However, not a single one of these projects garnered enough from tolls or wharfage 
fees to match basic maintenance costs, let alone the initial capital investment. Capital had 
to be supplied elsewhere. One source of subsidies is from the land taken by eminent 
domain, though the extent is hard to calculate without reliable information about fair 
market value against which to compare the damage awards. Most of the capital for these 
enterprises in fact came from voluntary, individual subscriptions of stock, supplemented, 
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in the case of the canal, by two large institutional investors. Some of New Haven’s 
wealthiest citizens contributed (and lost) significant sums. Morton Horwitz has written 
that in this same period the legal system tended to impose the burdens of economic 
development on poorer segments of society. The common law—through, for example, 
the growth of negligence, or the absence of a just compensation principle—“provide[d] 
substantial subsidies for those who undertook schemes of economic development.”125 As 
a result, Horwitz argues that “the tendency of subsidy through legal change during this 
period was dramatically to throw the burden of economic development on the weakest 
and least active elements in the population.”126 The story of the wharves, turnpikes, and 
canals at least casts some doubt on this conclusion. The wealthier citizens of New Haven 
not only sunk a great deal of money into unprofitable investments; they gave a 
tremendous amount of time serving as officers and commissioners for these corporations, 
selling the stock, and lobbying the legislature for charters and grants. Horwitz’s focus is 
almost exclusively on what happened in courts. I have focused on the law outside the 
courtroom, on transactional structures rather than the unfolding of judicial doctrine. From 
the more transaction point of view, the distribution of the costs of development looks 
more equitable: elite New Haveners willingly shouldered significant burdens to realize 
these public goods. 
 A major theme of this paper and this period of American legal history is how the 
law relates to the fundamental economic and technological change of the nineteenth 
century. Is law just dragged along passively by more powerful cultural or economic 
forces? Or can it affirmatively bring about social change? Nicholas Murray Butler, the 
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longtime President of Columbia University in the early twentieth century, believed the 
latter: “I weigh my words when I say that in my judgment the limited liability corporation 
is the greatest single discovery of modern times. . . . Even steam and electricity are far 
less important than the limited liability corporation, and they would be reduced to 
comparative impotence without it.”127 For Butler, law is the prime mover, engine of 
progress. A more modest theory—and the premise of this paper—is that law has some 
power the facilitate development and change, but that it is merely one of a range of 
institutional and social forces. The law can release energy, to use Hurst’s phrase, even if 
it is not itself energy. “The substance of what business wanted from law was the 
provision for ordinary use of an organization through which entrepreneurs could better 
mobilize and release economic energy.”128 Law is not just parasitic upon business; the 
two are joined in a healthier symbiosis. Ultimately, the law and the economy are 
interdependent, and in constant conversation. Developments in business require new legal 
mechanisms, which can then be creatively utilized in new, larger projects, which will 
then require more legal innovation, and so on. The history of New Haven in the early 
Republic exhibits this dialectic in action. 
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